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WHY AIRLINES SHOULD BE AFRAID: THE POTENTIAL
IMPACT OF CAP AND TRADE AND OTHER CARBON




P RESIDENT OBAMA made climate change one of the pillarsof his presidential campaign and has continued to press for
action on this issue, calling for the institution of a federal emis-
sions trading scheme in the form of a cap and trade program
designed to control greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.' In 2009
the House passed a bill creating a cap and trade system to con-
trol carbon emissions and other GHG emissions 2 and a similar
bill was introduced in the Senate.' Both of these bills would in-
clude jet fuel as a source of regulated carbon emissions, thus
* J.D. Candidate, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law,
2011; Ph.D., Classics, University of Wisconsin, 2008; M.A., University of Oregon,
2004; B.A., University of Texas, 2001. The author is grateful for the endless love
and patience of his wife and daughter.
I See New Energy for America, BARACKOBAMA.COM, http://www.barackobama.
com/issues/newenergy/index.php (last visited Sept. 9, 2010) (proposing a new
energy policy focused on using clean, renewable energy and fighting climate
change); Energy &Environment, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
issues/energy-and-environment (last visited Sept. 9, 2010) ("After decades of in-
action, we will finally close the carbon pollution loophole by limiting the amount
of carbon polluters are allowed to pump into the atmosphere."). Six gases are
classified as GHGs that contribute to climate change: "carbon dioxide (C0 2 ),
methane (CH 4), nitrous oxide (N 20), hydroflourocarbons (HFCs), perfluoro-
carbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF 6)." Endangerment and Cause or
Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under § 202(a) of the Clean Air Act
(CAA), 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,497 (Dec. 15, 2009) [hereinafter EPA Endanger-
ment Finding] (determining that "the body of scientific evidence compellingly
supports thle] finding" that these six gases are associated with climate change).
2 American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES Act), H.R. 2454, 111th
Cong. (2009); John M. Broder, House Passes Bill to Address Threat of Climate Change,
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2009, at Al.
3 Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2009);
Darren Samuelsohn & Ben Geman, Boxer-Kerry Draft Mirrors House Bill, with Some
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both would have an indirect effect on the U.S. commercial air-
line industry.4 Although these bills were abandoned in July
2010 for limited measures addressing energy efficiency and the
oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, they nonetheless have spurred a
great deal of support and criticism, along with calls for different
forms of action, including a carbon tax.' In addition, the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) appears ready to wield its
new power to regulate carbon emissions if Congress fails to take
legislative action in the near future.6
What impact will all of these new proposals have on the com-
mercial aviation industry? Although the airline industry is only a
modest producer of carbon and other GHGs, accounting for a
little over two percent of carbon emissions,' it falls within the
"transportation" sector of polluters, which is responsible for
about one-third of GHG and carbon emissions.' Additionally,
carbon emissions from airlines continue to increase, though not
as fast as the transportation sector as a whole.9 Consequently,
the commercial airline industry must be attentive to the devel-
opments surrounding this recent wave of potential legislation so
that it can be aware of the possible effects any new climate
change regulations may have. The regulation's potential to sig-
Exceptions, GREENWIRE (Sept. 29, 2009), http://www.eenews.net/public/Green-
wire/2009/09/29/1.
4 H.R. 2454 § 312 (amending the CAA by adding § 700(13) (B), (C)); S. 1733
§ 102 (amending the CAA by adding § 700(13) (B), (C)).
5 See Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats Call Off Climate Bill Effort,
N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2010, at A15; discussion infra Part II.D.
6 See EPA Endangerment Finding, supra note 1, at 66,496-99 (finding that six
GHGs, including C0 2 , are "air pollution" under § 202(a) of the CAA and thus fall
under the regulatory power of the EPA); John M. Broder, Greenhouse Gases Imperil
Health, E.P.A. Announces, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2009, at A18.
7 ENvrL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND
SINKs: 1990-2007, at 2-23, 2-24 tbl. 2.15 (2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/
climatechange/emissions/downloads09/GHG2007entire-report-508.pdf (noting
that "[t]hese figures include direct emissions from fossil fuel combustion, as well
as HFC emissions from mobile air conditioners and refrigerated transport allo-
cated to these vehicle types").
8 Id. at ES-8, ES-9 tbl. ES-3. Emissions from domestic commercial aircraft ac-
count for about eight percent of transportation emissions. Id. at 2-23.
9 From 1990 to 2007, CO2 emissions "from the domestic operation of commer-
cial aircraft increased by 13 percent (18.2 Tg CO 2 eq.)," while CO 2 emissions for
the transportation sector increased twenty-seven percent, and emissions from me-
dium- and heavy-duty trucks increased seventy-nine percent for the same period.
Id. at 3-14, 3-16 (noting that "[t]he operational efficiency of commercial aircraft
improved substantially because of a growing percentage of seats occupied per
flight, improvements in the fuel efficiency of new aircraft, and the accelerated
retirement of older, less fuel efficient aircraft").
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nificantly increase fossil fuel prices should also be of great con-
cern to the aviation industry, considering the ruinous effect the
cost of fuel has recently had on the industry.10
This comment examines the various emissions-reduction
plans currently being proposed in the United States to deter-
mine what form they may take and what impact they may have
on the U.S. commercial airline industry. Part II briefly discusses
the scientific findings supporting climate change before turning
to the fundamental policy options available for addressing cli-
mate change. This section examines the key aspects of the three
main forms of emissions regulation: command-and-control type
regulation, a carbon tax, and cap and trade. Part III expands
the analysis of the most popular form of emissions regulation,
cap and trade, by looking more closely at existing and proposed
cap and trade programs. This discussion begins with analysis of
the emissions trading system currently implemented in Europe.
From there, the discussion turns to existing U.S. cap and trade
systems, with a particular focus on the details of the cap and
trade programs currently pending before the 111th Congress.
Next, Part IV analyzes the various methods and proposals for
reducing carbon emissions with a particular eye toward the ef-
fect each would have on the commercial airline industry in
terms of regulation, compliance, and cost. This discussion in-
cludes industry responses to the proposed regulations and con-
siders what program best suits the distinctive needs of the
aviation industry. Finally, the discussion concludes that the cur-
rent proposals will act as an impediment to aviation. Therefore,
any climate change proposals must take a global, sectoral ap-
proach to the aviation industry. This entails recognizing and
adapting emissions-reduction programs to aviation's unique po-
sition as a global industry whose long-term goals are already in
line with climate change goals of emissions reduction.
II. POLICY OPTIONS FOR REDUCING
CARBON EMISSIONS
A. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE AND POLICY
Although some still debate the reality of climate change,"1
there is general scientific consensus that climate change is
10 See Caroline Brothers, Airlines Face 'Desperate' Situation, Official Says, N.Y.
TIMES, June 3, 2008, at C4.
11 E.g., About, GLOBALWARMING.ORG, http://www.globalwarming.org/about/
(last visited Sept. 9, 2010) ("[A]n informal and ad-hoc group focused on dispel-
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caused by the precipitous rise in human-created GHGs.12
Worldwide, governments, businesses, and citizens acknowledge
the need to address climate change now to mitigate the future
social and economic damages." Specifically, in 1992, the
United Nations (U.N.) gathered for the Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to develop an international plan
for addressing the dangerous effects of climate change.1 4 In
1997, the UNFCCC finalized the Kyoto Protocol, which became
effective in 2005.15 Under the Kyoto Protocol, the thirty-eight
developed nations agreed to reduce their carbon and other
GHG emissions over time through "the use of market-based
trading mechanisms."1 6 Although the United States is not a
party to the protocol because of disagreements over potential
negative economic impacts and the exclusion of developing
countries such as China and India from emissions-reduction
standards, the United States was instrumental in establishing the
cap and trade program used in the Kyoto Protocol.' 7 In Decem-
ber of 2009, the UNFCCC held another conference in Copenha-
gen, Denmark, to address climate change and to reach a global
agreement on reducing GHG emissions." The conference,
however, resulted in a short accord that only amounted to a
"statement on intention, not a binding pledge to begin taking
ling the myths of global warming by exposing flawed economic, scientific, and
risk analysis.").
12 See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 5 (2007), available
at http://www.ipcc-wgl.unibe.ch/publications/wgl-ar4/ar4-wgl-spm.pdf [here-
inafter IPCC] ("Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident
from observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures,
widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising global average sea level."); John
C. Dernbach & Seema Kakade, Climate Change Law: An Introduction, 29 ENERGY
L.J. 1, 3-5 (2008) (discussing the findings of the IPCC).
13 See Dernbach & Kakade, supra note 12, at 8 (noting governmental and non-
governmental reports on the possible consequences of climate change); Jody
Freeman & Andrew Guzman, Climate Change and U.S. Interests, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
1531, 1544-47 (2009) (discussing the likely scientific impact of global warming
and the economic costs this will have on the United States).
14 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change art. 3, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol];
Dernbach & Kakade, supra note 12, at 9-10.
15 Dernbach & Kakade, supra note 12, at 10.
16 Id. at 10; see also Cameron Ferrey & Steven Ferrey, Past is Prologue: Recent
Carbon Regulation Disputes in Europe Shape the U.S. Carbon Future, 16 Mo. ENVrtL. L.
& PoL'v REv. 650, 659-60 (2009).
17 Dernbach & Kakade, supra note 12, at 10-12.
18 Andrew C. Revkin &John M. Broder, A Grudging Accord in Climate Talks, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2009, at Al.
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action on global warming" and did not include any specific
targets for GHG reductions. 9 Nevertheless, climate change has
become one of the prominent issues facing world governments
and society today.
B. FUNDAMENTAL POLICY OPTIONS
Policy options for combating climate change by reducing
GHG emissions can take four basic forms: (1) controlling the
source of GHG emissions directly; (2) indirectly reducing GHGs
through energy efficiency and conservation; (3) directly storing
carbon long term where it cannot enter into the atmosphere;
and (4) adapting to the consequences of climate change that
are already occurring and cannot be stopped.20 While any effec-
tive climate change policy must involve options from all four cat-
egories, this comment focuses on the policies connected with
controlling GHG emissions at their source, since much of the
recent debate on national climate policy has focused on these
issues.21
Direct control policy options for GHG and carbon emissions
reduction fall into two basic categories: "proscriptive instru-
ments and economic instruments."2 2 Proscriptive instruments,
often called "command-and-control" regulations, usually involve
creating standards (either performance or technology based) to
control GHG emissions.23 Technology-based standards may take
the form of fuel economy or efficiency standards while perform-
ance-based standards can come as direct limits on the allowable
amount of carbon over a fixed period of time.24 Direct regula-
tion of carbon emissions by the EPA, as discussed further below,
would be an example of a performance-based proscriptive in-
strument.25 These types of instruments can often be costly to
implement because they require extensive monitoring and regu-
lation to ensure their effectiveness at reducing emissions.
19 Id. On January 31, 2010, a number of nations submitted their individual
goals to the UNFCCC for reducing emissions as part of the agreement reached at
the Copenhagen climate talks. John M. Broder, Countries Submit Emission Goals,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2010, at A10.
20 Dernbach & Kakade, supra note 12, at 8-9.
21 See id. at 9.
22 Brian C. Murray & Heather Hosterman, Climate Change, Cap-and-Trade and
the Outlook for U.S. Policy, 34 N.C. J. Ir'L L. & COM. REG. 699, 704 (2009).
23 Id. at 704-05.
24 Id.
25 See discussion infra Part II.C.
26 Murray & Hosterman, supra note 22, at 705.
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Alternatively, economic instruments, in the words of one com-
mentator, "place a monetary value on carbon, creating a finan-
cial incentive for technology to change to low carbon solutions
. .. "27 These market-based approaches have received the most
attention lately and appear either as a direct tax on carbon or as
part of a carbon emissions trading scheme, better known as cap
and trade.2 ' Another approach, called by some a "sectoral hy-
brid," combines the market-based cap and trade system with
command-and-control efficiency standards to provide a more
comprehensive approach for emissions reduction. 29 All of these
approaches are used in some form throughout the world and
have likewise been proposed for use in the United States as it
attempts to delineate a unified, federal climate policy.30 There-
fore, it is necessary to examine each method to determine which
one the airline industry might face and what the consequences
of each approach might be.
C. COMMAND-AND-CONTROL: EPA REGULATION
The possibility of command-and-control regulation of the avi-
ation industry in the form of fuel-efficiency standards is quite
possible. On December 15, 2009, the EPA released a finding
concluding that GHGs, including C02 , are a danger to public
health and safety and therefore fall under the EPA's regulatory
power under the Clean Air Act (CAA). This finding could
lead to specific command-and-control regulations that could
have a significant impact on consumers, businesses, and indus-
tries through higher costs and prices associated with compli-
ance.12 Additionally, the finding could allow the EPA to create
broader emissions regulations under section 231 of the CAA,
27 Id.
28 See Dernbach & Kakade, supra note 12, at 29-30; Kevin Doran & Alaine Gin-
nochio, United States Climate Policy: Using Market-Based Strategies to Achieve Green-
house Gas Emission Reductions, 3 ENvrL. & ENERGY L. & POL'YJ. 31, 38-41 (2008);
Murray & Hosterman, supra note 22, at 705.
29 Dernbach & Kakade, supra note 12, at 30.
30 See generally Murray & Hosterman, supra note 22 (discussing existing carbon
regulation programs and the forms of future U.S. policy on emissions
regulation).
31 EPA Endangerment Finding, supra note 1, at 66,497; see also Raymond B.
Ludwiszewski & Charles H. Haake, Climate Change: A Heat Wave of New Federal
Regulation and Legislation, 56 FED. LAw. 32, 32-34 (June 2009) (discussing the
background leading up to the EPA's endangerment finding).
32 See Ludwiszewski & Haake, supra note 31, at 35-37 (discussing the types of
regulations that could result from the endangerment finding); Broder, supra
note 6, at A18.
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which currently grants the EPA power to create standards for
regulating air pollutants from aircraft emissions.33
While President Obama has made clear that he prefers con-
gressional legislation in the form of market-based regulation, he
is holding the EPA's regulatory power as a goad for lawmakers
to act." Lawmakers and industries, however, have directly chal-
lenged the EPA's endangerment finding, and whether or not
the EPA will be able to implement regulations is still an open
question.3 ' Nevertheless, EPA regulation in the form of fuel-ef-
ficiency standards imposed on new engines seems a possibility in
the near future. 6
D. THE ELUSIVE CARBON TAx
Proponents of a carbon tax, which include many economists,
academics, and scientists, argue that it provides the simplest,
surest, and most effective method for reducing carbon emis-
sions.3  Essentially, a carbon tax features an "upstream" ap-
proach by placing a flat, fixed price on a limited number of
large-scale sources of CO2 emissions, such as mines, coal plants,
and oil and gas facilities." The tax would increase over time to
allow emitters to adjust to increased compliance costs and to
s3 Clean Air Act § 231, 42 U.S.C. § 7571 (2006). See generally Daniel H. Conrad,
Note, Into the Wild Green Yonder: Applying the Clean Air Act to Regulate Emissions of
Greenhouse Gases from Aircraft, 34 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 919, 922-23 (2009)
(discussing the history of the finding, analyzing the possible regulations that the
EPA could enforce on the aviation industry, and concluding that there is author-
ity for the EPA to regulate aviation emissions through fuel economy standards);
Clinton J. Woods, Note, Ground Control to EPA: The Regulation of Aviation Green-
house Gas Emissions under the Clean Air Act, NEW VOICES IN PUB. POL'Y, Spring 2009,
at 1-14 (discussing the events leading up to the endangerment finding and the
resulting policy options available to the EPA to regulate aviation emissions).
34 See Broder, supra note 6.
3 John M. Broder, Senators Want to Bar E.P.A. Greenhouse Gas Limits, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 21, 2010, at A14 (reporting that Senator Lisa Murkowski introduced legisla-
tion "to use the Congressional Review Act to strip the agency of the power to limit
emissions of [GHGs] under the [CAA]").
36 Conrad, supra note 33, at 948-49.
3 See, e.g., JAMES HANSEN, STORMS OF My GRANDCHILDREN 209-18 (2009) (call-
ing for a carbon "fee"); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating
Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax Is a Better Response to Global Warming than
Cap and Trade, 28 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 3, 6-7 (2009) (arguing that a carbon tax is a
more "efficient and effective market-based approach" than cap and trade); Sup-
porters, CARBON TAx CTR., http://www.carbontax.org/who-supports/ (last visited
Sept. 9, 2010) (listing supporters of a carbon tax).
- HANSEN, supra note 37, at 210 (preferring the term "fee" to tax); What's a
Carbon Tax?, CARBON TAx CTR., http://www.carbontax.org/introduction/#what
(last visited Sept. 9, 2010).
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spur movement away from carbon-intensive energy sources.39 As
designed, a carbon tax reduces emissions simply by raising the
price of fossil fuels, which would in turn motivate users of fossil
fuels to seek out and develop lower carbon solutions.4 0 Eventu-
ally, the low-carbon alternatives would cost less than their car-
bon-intensive counterparts and become the mainstream form of
energy production.4 1 All this is accomplished without the need
for a complex administrative structure such as would be re-
quired for EPA regulation and, to a certain degree, for a cap
and trade program.4 2
To reduce the impact on the economy and the tax burden on
consumers, advocates of a carbon tax stress that it should be rev-
enue neutral.4 3 This means that the government would not re-
tain the revenue collected from the tax, but instead would
disburse the revenue to taxpayers either in the form of a reduc-
tion in payroll taxes44 or as a per-capita, equal-dividend distribu-
tion.45  Advocates also argue that the tax is effectively
progressive in that it taxes the more affluent since they tend to
use more carbon-emitting energy sources than the poor.4 6
The carbon tax is not a new idea, however. Internationally,
Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Germany, New Zealand, and the
United Kingdom have implemented some form of direct carbon
tax to varying degrees of success. 7 France is also attempting to
establish a carbon tax; however, France's proposal faced some
difficulties after the country's constitutional court found that
the tax contained too many wholesale exemptions for large in-
dustries, including aviation, to make it an effective mechanism
for reducing GHG emissions.4 8 Domestically, proposals by the
Clinton administration for a broad energy tax aimed at large
carbon producers failed due to a lack of bipartisan support and
3 HANSEN, supra note 37, at 209-10.
- Id. at 210.
41 Id. at 211; Murray & Hosterman, supra note 22, at 705-06.
42 HANSEN, supra note 37, at 209-10.
43 What's a Carbon Tax?, supra note 38.
4 John M. Broder, House Bill for a Carbon Tax to Cut Emissions Faces a Steep Climb,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2009, at A13 (noting that Al Gore also supports a carbon tax
coupled with a reduction of payroll taxes).
4 HANSEN, supra note 37, at 209-10; What's a Carbon Tax?, supra note 38.
4 What's a Carbon Tax?, supra note 38.
47 See Where Carbon Is Taxed, CARBON TAx CTR., http://www.carbontax.org/pro-
gress/where-carbon-is-taxed/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2010).
4 James Kanter, Council in France Blocks a Carbon Tax as Weak on Polluters, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 30, 2009, at B4.
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opposition from the business community.49 Additionally, in
2007 two carbon tax bills were introduced in the House,50 and
in 2009, Representative John B. Larson, author of one of the
2007 bills, introduced yet another to no avail.
The problems encountered by the failed House and the Clin-
ton-era bills demonstrate one of the biggest problems con-
fronting a carbon tax: a lack of political will. In the United
States lawmakers are loathe to utter the word "tax."5 2 Largely
for this reason they have given carbon tax proposals a wide
berth.53  As the recent French attempt at a carbon tax also
shows, passing a measure that appeases various business interests
with strong lobbying power means that the bill may require so
many exemptions as to render it useless for reducing emis-
sions.54 Because of these issues surrounding a carbon tax, nu-
merous industries and several prominent environmental groups
favor a cap and trade program. 5 They argue that cap and trade
offers more flexibility regarding methods of compliance while
still maintaining the same environmental goals. 6
49 SeeJanet E. Milne, Carbon Taxes in the United States: The Context for the Future,
10 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 6-10; Murray & Hosterman, supra note 22, at 706.
50 Save Our Climate Act of 2007, H.R. 2069, 110th Cong. § 3(a) (2007);
America's Energy Security Trust Fund Act of 2007, H.R. 3416, 110th Cong. § 2(a)
(2007); see also Milne, supra note 49, at 19-20 (discussing the 2007 House bills).
51 America's Energy Security Trust Fund Act of 2007, H.R. 1337, 111th Cong.
§ 4691 (a) (2007); Broder, supra note 44.
52 Kenneth P. Green et al., Climate Change: Caps vs. Taxes, ENvTL. POL'Y OUT-
LOOK, June 2007, at 4, available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20070601_EPOg.
pdf (" [T]here is a broad consensus in favor of a carbon tax everywhere except on
Capitol Hill, where the 'T word' is anathema.").
53 Broder, supra note 44.
54 For example, the U.S. Climate Action Partnership (USCAP) is a "non parti-
san coalition" calling for "strong national legislation" to reduce GHGs and sup-
porting cap and trade over a carbon tax. U.S. CLIMATE ACTION P'SHIP, ISSUE
OVERVIEW: CAP AND TRADE VERSUS CARBON TAx (March 2009), available at http://
www.us-cap.org/policy-statements/ (follow "Cap and Trade vs. Carbon Tax"
hyperlink). USCAP members include such industry-leaders as Alcoa, Co-
nocoPhillips, the Dow Chemical Company, Ford, General Electric, General Mo-
tors, Johnson & Johnson, PepsiCo, Rio Tinto, Shell, Siemens Corporation, and
environmental groups such as the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), the Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council (NRDC), the Nature Conservancy, and the Pew
Center on Global Climate Change. Id.
55 U.S. CLIMATE AcroN P'sHIP, supra note 54; PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE, CLIMATE POLICY MEMO #1: CAP AND TRADE v TAxEs (2009), available at
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Policy-Memo-1-CapTradevTax-09%20
07%2001.pdf.
56 See, e.g., U.S. CLIMATE AcroN P'SHIP, supra note 54.
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E. CAP AND TRADE IN THEORY
This second market-based approach, cap and trade, has come
to the forefront of the emissions regulation debate thanks pri-
marily to two major congressional bills that feature the ap-
proach.67 These bills came as several regional cap and trade
programs were coming on-line or were in the planning stages
across the United States." Additionally, the European Union
(EU) has implemented a cap and trade system under the guide-
lines established by the Kyoto Protocol.59 Because of the promi-
nence and growth of cap and trade as a favored method for
reducing emissions of carbon and other GHGs, it is necessary to
examine first the fundamental structure and elements of a cap
and trade program in theory. Following this discussion, Part IV
turns to analyzing existing systems and the proposed congres-
sional legislation to determine what form a federal cap and
trade program might take.
1. Emissions Trading
Cap and trade shares the same basic goal as a carbon tax: to
control and reduce carbon emissions from certain sources by
increasing the cost of using carbon-rich fossils fuels and, in turn,
encouraging alternative low-carbon solutions.60 The mecha-
nisms of cap and trade, however, differ greatly from a carbon
tax. The Pew Center for Global Climate Change, a non-profit,
non-partisan organization that analyzes climate change issues,
describes the fundamentals of a cap and trade program as
follows:
In a cap-and-trade program, the government determines which
facilities or emissions are covered by the program and sets an
57 American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES Act), H.R. 2454, 111th
Cong. (2009); Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong.
(2009).
58 Programs include the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the
Northeast, the Western Climate Initiative, and the Midwest Greenhouse Gas Re-
duction Accord. PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANCE, CLIMATE CHANGE 101:
CAP AND TRADE 7-8 (2009) [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE 101], available at http:/
/www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/ClimatelOl-CapTrade-JanO9.pdf.
5 See A. DENNY ELLERMAN & PAUL L. JosKow, THE EUROPEAN UNION'S EMIs-
sIONs TRADING SYSTEM IN PERSPECTIVE (Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change 2008),
available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/EU-ETS-In-Perspective-
Report.pdf.
60 CLIMATE CHANGE 101, supra note 58, at 1; Murray & Hosterman, supra note
22, at 707-08; Cap and Trade: Essentials, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://
www.epa.gov/captrade/documents/ctessentials.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2010).
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overall emission target, or "cap," for covered entities. This cap is
the sum of all allowed emissions from all included facilities.
Once the cap has been set and covered entities specified, trad-
able emissions allowances (rights to emit) are distributed (either
auctioned, or freely allocated, or some combination of these).
Each allowance authorizes the release of a specified amount of
[GHG] emissions, generally one ton of carbon dioxide
equivalent (CO 2e). The total number of allowances is equivalent
to the overall emissions cap (e.g., if a cap of one million tons of
emissions is set, one million one-ton allowances will be issued).
Covered entities must submit allowances equivalent to the level
of emissions for which they are responsible at the end of each of
the program's compliance periods."
Much of cap and trade's attractiveness comes in the flexibility
inherent in the allowance-trading feature. 2 Because emitters
will face different compliance costs, allowance trading lets these
emitters structure their compliance strategies according to their
most cost-effective individual situations, while still retaining the
end environmental goals of carbon reduction.6 ' For example,
emitters for whom it would be too costly to reduce emissions can
purchase allowances from emitters whose emissions-reductions
costs are lower and thus have a surplus of allowances. This
structure "giv[es] firms a financial incentive to control emissions
and the flexibility to determine how and when emissions will be
reduced."" Proponents argue that this system provides further
incentives to innovate low-carbon solutions because emitters will
seek to reduce their emissions and, in turn, have more al-
lowances to sell on the market.6 6
2. Key Aspects of a Cap and Trade Program
There are several key questions that need to be asked about a
cap and trade program in deciding on its exact form: (1) what
emissions will be capped; (2) whose emissions will be capped;
(3) how stringent should the caps be; (4) what "safety valves," if
any, should be built into the system to stem volatility; and (5)
how should the allowances be distributed?67 As for which emis-
sions to cap, most of the current cap and trade proposals focus
61 CLIMATE CHANGE 101, supra note 58, at 1.
62 See id. at 1-3.
63 Id. at 1; Cap and Trade: Essentials, supra note 60.
6 Murray & Hosterman, supra note 22, at 708.
65 CLIMATE CHANGE 101, supra note 58, at 1.
66 Id. at 3.
67 Id.
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primarily on carbon emissions as the target GHG, though earlier
U.S. cap and trade programs have focused on acid rain-causing
sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) and ozone-causing nitrous oxide (NOx). 6
Regarding the second question of whom to cap, there are ba-
sically three choices: upstream emitters, downstream emitters,
or a combination of the two.' 9 An upstream program, like a car-
bon tax, focuses on the ports of entry where carbon first enters
into the market. 0 This allows for broad coverage of carbon
emissions from a smaller number of emitters .7  Downstream
programs, on the other hand, cover direct emitters of carbon,
such as power plants, manufacturers, and vehicles.7 2 Down-
stream programs have the advantage of "put[ing] the compli-
ance obligation (and hence costs) directly on entities that can
reduce GHG emissions by, for example, improving process effi-
ciency, changing processes, or substituting material and fuel in-
puts."7 This differs from upstream programs, which rely on
emissions-reduction incentives in the form of cost increases
passed down by the fossil fuel suppliers. A hybrid approach
involving both upstream and downstream regulation is also a
possibility, but it comes with its own unique problems.
The third question-how stringent should the cap be-basi-
cally deals with what forms of cost-containment measures should
be available to mitigate compliance costs.76 Policy options for
stringency include a gradual introduction of caps, perhaps in
some sectors earlier than others, with the stringency increasing
over time as firms become accustomed to the caps and allow-
ance-trading market.77 Other cost-containment measures come
in the form of safety valves and offsets.7 8 Safety valves allow
68 See Cap and Trade: Acid Rain Program Basics, ENvT. PROT. AGENCY, http://
www.epa.gov/captrade/documents/arbasics.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2010); Cap
and Trade: Multi-State NOx Programs, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
captrade/documents/nox.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2010).
69 PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CONGRESSIONAL POLICY BRIEF: SCOPE
OF A GREENHOUSE GAS CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM 6-9 (2008) [hereinafter POLICY
BRIEF], available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Scope.pdf.
70 Id. at 6.
71 CLIMATE CHANGE 101, supra note 58, at 4.
72 Id.
7 POLICY BRIEF, supra note 69, at 8.
74 Id.
75 See id. at 8-9.
76 See CLIMATE CHANGE 101, supra note 58, at 3.
" POLICY BRIEF, supra note 69, at 9.




changes to the program during periods of unexpected market
volatility and include capping carbon prices, "increasing the
availability of offset credits, changing the timing of program
compliance, or expanding the use of 'borrowing' allowances."7 9
This lets emitters essentially take "loans" of allowances from reg-
ulators in times of need.s0 Offsets occur when "'uncapped' or
unregulated sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, for-
estry, landfills, and livestock . . . voluntarily reduce their emis-
sions (or increase carbon storage) to offset the emissions of
another entity covered by the cap."s" Capped entities can then
purchase the offsets to increase their allowances and reduce
their compliance costs. 2 Offset projects, however, need to have
verified and measurable effects to maintain the integrity of the
carbon reduction goals."
How allowances should be distributed-allocation or auc-
tion-is primarily a question of initial start-up cost and long-
term program cost. 4 Free allocation of allowances has the ben-
efit of reducing the initial cost of compliance, especially for
emitters who are placed at a competitive disadvantage by the
85
cap. On the other hand, the revenue created from allowance
auctions can be used to encourage firms to move to low-carbon
technologies through direct funding, incentives, or as offsets for
the cost of higher compliance and energy costs.86 Naturally,
both free distributions and auctions come with their own partic-
ular concerns, benefits, and drawbacks.
In examining a cap and trade program with the above ques-
tions in mind, there are also five factors that an emissions trad-
ing system should meet to be successful. First, the emissions cap
must remain at a level sufficient "to create market demand for
79 CLIMATE CHANGE 101, supra note 58, at 5.
80 Id.
81 Murray & Hosterman, supra note 22, at 711-12.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 711-15 (discussing "critical issues in ensuring the environmental integ-
rity of the offset policy"); Maria Savasta-Kennedy, The Newest Hybrid: Notes Toward
Standardized Certification of Carbon Offsets, 34 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 851
(2009) (discussing carbon offsets as fundamental to cap and trade programs and
the need for government oversight and regulation of these new assets); Thomas
P. Healy, Comment, Clearing the Air: Pursuing a Course to Define the Federal Govern-
ment's Role in the Voluntary Carbon Offset Market, 61 ADMIN. L. REv. 871 (discussing
the regulatory tools necessary to oversee a carbon offset market).
84 CLIMATE CHANGE 101, supra note 58, at 5.
85 Id. at 5-7.
86 Id. 6-7.
87 See id. at 5-6.
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allowances, maintain a carbon price, and to meet environmental
targets."" Second, compliance must be guaranteed in order to
maintain the value of the emissions allowances on the market.8 9
Third, there must be flexibility "to allow companies to choose
the cheapest reduction methods and therefore lower the total
overall cost of reducing [carbon] emissions."90 Fourth, regula-
tory certainty over a long-term period is required to assure that
firms will be able to "incorporate the accurate costs of [carbon]
emissions into the future cost of production."9 1 Finally, the pro-
gram must have transparency "to foster public and private trust
in the market."92
III. CAP AND TRADE: EXISTING AND
PROPOSED PROGRAMS
Throughout the world, there are a number of existing and
proposed cap and trade programs that are based on the funda-
mental principles outlined above. A brief examination of the
structure of several of these systems and the issues they have en-
countered will shed light on areas of concern for the aviation
industry.
A. INTERNATIONAL CAP AND TRADE: THE EU EMISSIONS
TRADING SYSTEM
The Kyoto Protocol calls for thirty-eight developed nations to
reduce their GHG emissions under a basic cap and trade sys-
tem. 9" In 2005, the EU established the Emissions Trading Sys-
tem (EU ETS) based on the standards set by the Kyoto Protocol,
even though the program operates independently of the Kyoto
Protocol. 94 The EU ETS differs from classic cap and trade pro-
grams in two important ways: (1) it covers only carbon emis-
sions, not all GHGs; and (2) it covers only emissions from
88 Jonathan Donehower, Comment, Analyzing Carbon Emissions Trading: A Po-




91 Id. at 183.
92 Id.
93 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 3; see also Ferrey & Ferrey, supra note 16,
at 659-66 (describing the aspects of the Kyoto Protocol cap and trade program).
94 ELLERMAN & JOSKOW, supra note 59, at 1-6; U.S. CUmATE AcTION P'SHIP,
ISSUE OVERVIEW: EUROPE'S EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM (March 2009), http://




specified sources, such as the power and industrial sectors.15
The EU ETS was designed to be implemented in three phases,
which allowed the European Commission, who oversees the EU
ETS, to adjust the program during the initial "learning" phase
that ran from 2005 to 2007.96 The second phase, running from
2008 to 2012, coincides with the deadlines set by the Kyoto Pro-
tocol for meeting mandatory emissions-reduction goals but still
only covers about forty-six percent of carbon emissions. The
third phase, starting in 2013, expands the scope of the emissions
regulated to include more industries and cover a higher per-
centage of carbon emissions."
While the Kyoto Protocol program does not include emissions
from aviation,99 the third phase of the EU ETS is scheduled to
bring aviation emissions into the regulatory framework begin-
ningJanuary 1, 2012.00 In 2009, the European Commission re-
leased a list of airlines, including almost 1,000 from the United
States, which will be subject to the EU ETS.10 Under the pro-
gram, eighty-five percent of allowances will be distributed freely
and the rest auctioned.1 o2 The cap, however, will not be a "hard
cap" meaning that airlines can purchase additional allowances
from the pool available on the market, if necessary.10 Purchas-
ing extra allowances, of course, would increase costs for the air-
95 ELLERMAN & JOSKOw, supra note 59, at 3. For the most part, the EU ETS
focuses on downstream compliance. POLIcY BRIEF, supra note 69, at 8.
96 ELLERMAN & JOSKOW, supra note 59, at 2-3.
97 U.S. CLMATE AcrloN P'SHIP, supra note 94.
98 Id. The European Commission reached decisions about the scope of its
emissions trading program post-2013 in April, 2009. Emission Trading System (EU
ETS): EU ETS Post 2012, EUROPA.EU, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/
emission/ets-post2012_en.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2010) (describing and pro-
viding hyperlinks to the legislation passed by the European Commission in April,
2009).
99 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 2, 1 2 (stating that the responsibility
for reducing GHGs from aviation fuels falls on the parties working in conjunction
with the ICAO).
W00 Council Directive 2009/29, Amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to Im-
prove and Extend the Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Scheme of
the Community, Annex 1, 2009 0.J. (L 140) 84, 86 (EC); Paul Voosen, Airlines
Will Be First U.S. Industry to Confront Cap and Trade, N.Y. TIMEs (Aug. 12, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/08/12/12greenwire-airlines-will-be-first-
us-industry-to-confront-77552.html?scp=4&sq=voosen&st=cse.
101 Commission Regulation 748/2009, Annex, 2009 0.J. (L 219) 1, 2 (EC).
102 Voosen, supra note 100.
1os Id.
2010] 755
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
lines and is one of the tools the cap and trade program uses to
motivate companies to seek low-carbon solutions.'0 4
With some estimating that this program will cost the airline
industry nearly $50 billion in compliance costs between 2012
and 2020, the aviation industry has been critical of the EU's uni-
lateral approach to emissions regulation on non-EU member
airlines.1 o5 Rather, airlines and aviation industry groups, such as
the Air Transport Association of America (ATA), are calling for
a global, sector-based approach that would address carbon emis-
sions regulation under the management of the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a U.N. agency charged with
overseeing global aviation issues.o 6 In fact, in late 2009 the
ATA, along with Continental, American, and United Airlines,
filed suit against the U.K. Secretary of State for Energy and Cli-
mate Change in an attempt to block the EU ETS program's in-
clusion of the aviation sector."0o
Some of the other problems facing the EU ETS may have a
direct impact on other emissions-trading schemes and on the
proposed U.S. legislation.'0 8 For example, the decline of carbon
allowances' prices following the climate summit in Copenhagen
highlights a weakness in the market system: if prices on carbon
allowances are too low, then there is no incentive to move to
low-carbon solutions.'9 If these low prices remain, it could
make a cap and trade system less attractive to congressional
members who would be deciding whether to support any pro-
posed U.S. climate change legislation.110
104 See CLIMATE CHANGE 101, supra note 58, at 1, 3.
105 Ben Moshinsky, U.S. Airlines, Industry Group Sue U.K. Over Emissions Plan,
Bus. WK. (Dec. 17, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/
dec2009/gb20091217_576581.htm; Voosen, supra note 100.
106 Moshinsky, supra note 105; Voosen, supra note 100; see also discussion infra
Part IV.C.
107 Moshinsky, supra note 105.
108 See ELLERMAN & JOSKOw, supra note 59, at 24-45; Ferrey & Ferrey, supra
note 16, at 677-89.
109 See Keith Johnson, Carbon-Permit Slide Reflects Copenhagen Disappointment,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 2009, at A4; James Kanter, EU Carbon Trading System Brings
Windfalls for Some, with Little Benefit to Climate, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2008), http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/12/09/business/worldbusiness/09iht-
windfall.4.18536167.html.
110 See Camille Ricketts, Carbon Permits Take a Dive Post-Copenhagen-Could Drag





B. THE U.S. CAP AND TRADE EXPERIENCE
Members of Congress need not look only to Europe for exam-
ples of cap and trade programs as the United States has almost
twenty years of experience with cap and trade programs de-
signed to reduce air pollutants."' Of the five programs, the
EPA has administered three, including the largest and most suc-
cessful program, known as the Acid Rain Trading Program,
which was designed to reduce S02 emissions.'1 2 Although these
programs are regionally focused, they have proven to be both
cost-efficient and effective at reaching their environmental
goals."'3
In addition to the programs focused on reducing airborne
pollutants, several regions have implemented cap and trade pro-
grams with the goal of reducing carbon emissions.114 These pro-
grams have arisen mainly in response to the United States'
decision not to join the Kyoto Protocol or to institute a federal
cap and trade program to control carbon emissions." The first
and largest program, known as the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (RGGI), covers ten Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic
states and sets a mandatory cap on carbon emissions from power
plants that will be incrementally reduced after 2015.11' Five
western states and several Canadian provinces have taken even
more ambitious steps in formulating a cap and trade system that
employs a multi-sector approach and covers all six GHGs, but
several states still need to pass legislation before the program
can begin."' In addition, a number of Midwestern states have
taken a similar multi-sector approach that covers all GHGs and
III David Harrison, Jr. et al., Using Emissions Trading to Combat Climate Change:
Programs and Key Issues, in CLEAN AIR: LAw, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 155, 159 (ALI-
ABA Course of Study 2008).
112 Id. at 159-62; Cap and Trade: Acid Rain Program Basics, supra note 68.
113 Harrison, Jr. et al., supra note 111, at 159-62.
114 CLIMATE CHANGE 101, supra note 58, at 7-9; Ferrey & Ferrey, supra note 16,
at 666-67.
115 Ferrey & Ferrey, supra note 16, at 666.
116 Id. at 666-68; see also Tseming Yang, The Problem of Maintaining Emissions
"Caps" in Carbon Trading Programs Without Federal Government Involvement: A Brief
Examination of the Chicago Climate Exchange and the Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative, 17 FoRDHAM ENvTL. L. REv. 271, 282-86 (2006); Michael W. Hall, Com-
ment, The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and California Assembly Bill 1493: Filling
the American Greenhouse Gas Regulation Void, 41 U. RICH. L. REv. 567, 569-75
(2007); Rachel F. Harrison, Comment, Carbon Allowances: A New Way of Seeing an
Invisible Asset, 61 SMU L. REv. 1915, 1925-34 (2009).
117 Ferrey & Ferrey, supra note 16, at 673-76.
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uses a cap and trade system to help achieve reduction goals. 18
California has also taken independent measures to place aggres-
sive state-wide caps on GHG emissions from major producers.119
However, due to the economic crisis in California, some have
called for putting the program on hold until the economy and
jobs recover because of the potential economic burden caused
by compliance costs.12 o
C. PROPOSED LEGISLATION, 111TH CONGRESS
With concerns over the effectiveness of regional programs
and the unpredictability associated with regional regulation of
national industries, calls from industries, scholars, and environ-
mental groups for federal action on climate change have been
growing steadily since the new millennium. 12 1 During the 106th
Congress (1999-2000), lawmakers introduced almost thirty leg-
islative proposals addressing climate change.122 This figure
jumped to 235 bills, resolutions, and amendments introduced in
the 110th Congress (2007-2008).123 Of these, ten called for the
creation of an economy-wide cap and trade program. 1 24 Further
motivated by President Obama's desire to enact a federally-run
cap and trade program, the 111th Congress has seen the intro-
duction of a number of comprehensive climate change bills in
both houses as well.12 5 In particular, one sponsored by Con-
118 Id. at 675-76.
119 Id. at 668-73.
120 Opinion, California Cap-and-Trade Revolt, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2010, at Al8.
121 E.g., U.S. CLIMATE ACTION P'sHIP, A BLUEPRINT FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION 2
(2009), (calling for "well-aligned national energy and climate policies that set out
a new direction for the country"); Joseph Allen MacDougald, Why Climate Law
Must Be Federal: The Clash Between Commerce Clause jurisprudence and State Greenhouse
Gas Trading Systems, 40 CONN. L. REv. 1431 (2008) (arguing that climate law must
be federally based because of potential limitations to regional measures imposed
by the dormant commerce clause); Yang, supra note 116, at 286.
122 106th Congress Proposals, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, http://
www.pewclimate.org/what-s_beingdone/in_thecongress/leg-proposals.cfm
(last visited Sept. 9, 2010).
123 Legislation in the 110th Congress Related to Global Climate Change, PEW CTR. ON
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.pewclimate.org/federal/Congress/110
(last visited Sept. 9, 2010).
124 Economy-Wide Cap & Trade Proposals in the 110th Congress, PEW CTR. ON
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Chart-and-
Graph-120108.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2010).
125 Climate Action in Congress, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANCE, http://
www.pewclimate.org/what s being-done/in_thescongress (last visited Sept. 9,
2010) (listing the key climate legislation pending in the 111th Congress).
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gressmen Henry Waxman and Edward Markey passed a vote in
the House in summer 2009.121
1. The Waxman-Markey House Bill (House Bill 2454)
The Waxman-Markey Bill, named the American Clean Energy
and Security Act (ACES), passed the House of Representatives
on June 26, 2009, by a vote of 219-212.121 In general, the Bill
offers a blend of proscriptive and economic measures, including
creating higher energy efficiency standards, investing in clean
energy technologies, and reducing carbon emissions through a
cap and trade program. 12 8 The cap and trade program, or emis-
sions-trading system, is based largely on the classic model dis-
cussed above and the Acid Rain Trading Program implemented
by the EPA.12 9 It features a limited-source approach that caps
GHG emissions on "large U.S. sources like electric utilities and
oil refiners."3 o About eighty percent of allowances will be "dis-
tributed without charge during the early years of the program to
ease the transition to a clean energy economy."1 3 1 The Bill also
allows for the use of offsets and contains provisions to protect
consumers and certain trades and industries, such as oil refin-
eries, which would be more adversely affected by the caps be-
cause of their high CO 2 emissions and, as a result, would face
higher compliance costs. 13 2
While the Bill does not attempt to cap aviation emissions di-
rectly, it does hold producers ofjet fuel responsible for the emis-
sions resulting from their products."3 This differs from the EU
ETS program, which is scheduled to place a direct cap on air-
126 American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES Act), H.R. 2454, 111th
Cong. (2009).
127 John M. Broder, House Passes Bill to Address Threat of Climate Change, N.Y.
TIMES, June 26, 2009, at Al.
128 Press Release, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Summary: The American
Clean Energy and Security Act (H.R. 2454), at 1, 3 (July 2009), available at http:/
/energycommerce.house.gov/PressI 11/20090724/hr2454_housesummary.pdf.
129 Id. at 3.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 4.
132 Id. at 3, 5-6.
133 American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES Act), H.R. 2454, 111th
Cong. § 312 (2009) (amending the CAA by adding § 700(13) (B), (C) to define a
"covered entity" as including producers of "petroleum-based" liquid fuel); id.
§ 351 (a) (3) (amending the Commodity Exchange Act to include "jet fuel" as an
"energy commodity" for the purpose of the act); Madhu Unnikrishnan & Robert
Wall, Washington Enters Fray on Aviation Cap-and-Trade Debate, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., Apr. 13, 2009, at 41.
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lines' carbon emissions and consequently impose a direct cost
on airlines.1 34 Instead, the likely effect of the Waxman-Markey
Bill is that producers will pass their cost increases down to the
airlines in the form of higher fuel prices.' The aviation indus-
try has raised concerns that these increased costs will amount to
double taxation for international flights coming from or going
to Europe, since these flights will be subject to both the in-
creased fuel prices resulting from the U.S. cap and trade pro-
gram and the costs of the direct carbon regulation under the
EU ETS.1"6 The Waxman-Markey Bill, however, does acknowl-
edge these concerns and other unique issues faced by the avia-
tion industry, specifically stating that:
It is the sense of Congress that the United States should-(1)
continue to actively promote, within the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization, the development of a global framework for
the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from civil aircraft
that recognizes the uniquely international nature of the industry
and treats commercial aviation industries in all countries fairly;
and (2) work with foreign governments towards a global agree-
ment that reconciles foreign carbon emissions reduction pro-
grams to minimize duplicative requirements and avoids
unnecessary complication for the aviation industry, while still
achieving the environmental goals.1 3 7
Although this statement does not take any actual steps toward
addressing this issue, it seems to leave the door open for future
adjustments to the bill regarding the regulation of aircraft emis-
sions and any conflicts that may arise regarding international
flights.
Section 221 is also of importance to the airline industry as it
amends Title VIII of the CAA and directs the EPA to establish
emissions standards for new aircraft and aircraft engines. 1 3 8
134 See discussion supra, Part III.A.
135 Unnikrishnan & Wall, supra note 133.
136 Id.
137 H.R. 2454 § 276.
138 Id. § 221. The section would amend § 821(c) of Title VIII of the Clean Air
Act to read:
In establishing standards applicable to emissions of greenhouse
gases pursuant to this section and sections 202(a), 213(a)(4) and
(5), and 231(a), the Administrator may establish provisions for
averaging, banking, and trading of greenhouse gas emissions cred-
its within or across classes or categories of motor vehicles and mo-
tor vehicle engines, nonroad vehicles and engines (including
marine vessels), and aircraft and aircraft engines, to the extent the
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Such a command-and-control provision, as discussed above,
could have a direct effect on the airline industry by increasing
compliance costs, depending on the stringency of the standards.
2. The Kerry-Boxer Senate Bill (Senate Bill 1733)
In September 2009, Senators John Kerry and Barbara Boxer
introduced a companion bill to the Waxman-Markey Bill in the
Senate called the Clean Energy Jobs & American Power Act."' 9
The Kerry-Boxer Bill is far narrower in scope than the Waxman-
Markey Bill, as it focuses primarily on a cap and trade system for
reducing GHGs, thus leaving the clean energy issues to the Sen-
ate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, which oversees
most energy issues."' The Kerry-Boxer Bill is, however,
modeled largely after the relevant portions of the Waxman-Mar-
key Bill.1 4 1 Although the two differ in some respects, such as
emissions-reduction goals, their approach toward aviation re-
mains largely the same. 4 2 For example, both place the cost and
burden of compliance within the cap and trade programs on the
oil producers, who are then likely to pass the cost down in the
Administrator determines appropriate and considering the factors
appropriate in setting standards under those sections.
Id.
139 Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2009);
Darren Samuelsohn, Boxer, Kerry Set to Introduce Climate Bill in Senate, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 28, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/09/28/28climatewire-
boxer-kerry-set-to-introduce-climate-bill-in-43844.html. The Bill passed through
committee in November 2009. Press Release, U.S. S. Comm. Env't & Pub. Works,
Boxer Statement on Committee Passage of S. 1733 - The Clean Energy Jobs and
American Power Act (Nov. 5, 2009), available at http://epw.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm?FuseAction=Majority.PressReleases&ContentRecordid=c512ac4d-80
2a-23ad-4884-2b95a8405efe.
140 PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, AT A GLANCE: CLEAN ENERGY JOBS
AND AMERICAN POWER ACT (November 2009), http://www.pewclimate.org/
docUploads/short-summary-kerry-boxer-epw-committee-11-05-09.pdf. A bill fo-
cused only on clean energy, which was introduced in the Senate by Senator Jeff
Bingaman and passed out of committee on June 17, 2009, shares much in com-
mon with the relevant energy portions of the Waxman-Markey Bill. See The
American Clean Energy Leadership Act of 2009 (ACELA), S.1462, 111th Cong.
(2009); PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, ACELA SUMMARY AND COMPARI-
SON TO THE ACES ACT (October 2009), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/
docUploads/acela-summary-aces-act-comparison-oct2009.pdf.
141 Samuelsohn, supra note 139.
142 See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 140 (summarizing the
Bill and noting where it follows and where it departs from the Waxman-Markey
House Bill).
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form of higher prices.1 4 s Additionally, just like the Waxman-
Markey Bill, the Kerry-Boxer Bill requires that the EPA set GHG
emissions standards for new aircraft and aircraft engines. 1"
While the Waxman-Markey Bill passed the House by a narrow
vote, the Kerry-Boxer Bill never made it to a vote.1 4 5 In particu-
lar, some senators expressed concern over the lack of consensus
about what form cap and trade should take amid growing uncer-
tainty regarding the complexities of cap and trade.14 6 Even the
co-sponsor of the bill, Senator Kerry, along with Senators Joseph
Lieberman and Lindsey Graham, submitted a letter to President
Obama outlining a "basic framework for climate action" in or-
der "to provide an assessment of where we see the debate head-
ing in the United States Senate." 4 7 As this letter suggests, it is
difficult to pin down the details of what a Senate cap and trade
program might encompass.
3. Other Proposals: The Cantwell-Collins Bill (Senate Bill 2877)
Adding to the uncertainty, several proposals have been intro-
duced in the Senate in addition to the two bills discussed
above.' 4 8 One in particular, the Carbon Limits and Energy for
America's Renewal Act (CLEAR), introduced on December 11,
2009, by Senators Maria Cantwell and Susan Collins,14 9 has at-
tracted some attention as a feasible alternative to the cap and
143 S. 1733 § 102 (amending the CAA by adding § 700 (13) (B), which defines a
"covered entity" as including producers of "petroleum-based" liquid fuel); H.R.
2454, 111th Cong. § 312 (2009) (using the same definition as S. 1733 § 102).
1 S. 1733 § 111 (amending § 821(c) of the CAA to require the EPA to set
emissions standards for new aircraft and aircraft engines); H.R. 2454 § 221 (using
the same language as S. 1733 § 111).
145 See, e.g., Susan Montoya Bryan, Bingaman: Cap and Trade Bill Unlikely This
Year, ABC NEws (Jan. 5, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=
9485513; Hulse & Herszenhorn, supra note 5.
146 E.g., Bryan, supra note 145; Lisa Lerer, Jim Webb Bails on Cap-And-Trade, Po-
LITICO (Nov. 16, 2009), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1109/29582.
html; Camille Ricketts, Dems Throw in the Towel on Climate Bill for 2009, GREEN
BEAT (Nov. 11, 2009), http://green.venturebeat.com/2009/11/11/dems-throw-
in-the-towel-on-climate-bill-for-2009/.
147 Letter from John Kerry, Joseph I. Lieberman, and Lindsey 0. Graham, U.S.
Senators, to Barack Obama, Pres. of the United States (Dec. 10, 2009), available
at http://kerry.senate.gov/newsroom/pdf/ClimateFramework.pdf; see also
Camille Ricketts, Climate Bill Chaos: Your Guide to the Two Newest Proposals, GREEN
BEAT (Dec. 28, 2009), http://green.venturebeat.com/2009/12/28/climate-bill-
chaos-your-guide-to-the-two-newest-proposals/.
148 See Climate Action in Congress, supra note 125.
149 Carbon Limits and Energy for America's Renewal Act (CLEAR Act), S.
2877, 111th Cong. (2009).
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trade systems proposed in the Waxman-Markey and the Kerry-
Boxer Bills.o50 But, just as the other bills, the Cantwell-Collins
Bill is designed to reduce carbon emissions by raising the price
of fossil fuels and encouraging the use of low-carbon energy
sources."' Although the Cantwell-Collins Bill calls for an emis-
sions trading system to reduce carbon emissions much like the
other two bills, the system differs in several significant ways.1 52
First, the Bill takes an upstream approach to cap and trade,
capping the carbon content of fossil fuels at the point of entry
into the system, such as the wellhead, mine, or refinery.1 5 3 This
differs from the limited downstream approach taken by the
Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Boxer Bills, which placed caps on
large carbon emitters, including refineries, electricity produc-
ers, and large manufacturers.15 1 Moreover, the Cantwell-Collins
Bill does not allow for use of carbon offsets.' 5 5
Second, the Cantwell-Collins Bill takes a different approach in
structuring how carbon shares are traded on the market.5 I For
one, the bill would auction off all the allowances from the out-
set, rather than give away free allowances and gradually intro-
duce auctioning, as the other two bills do.'5 ' Further, the
Cantwell-Collins Bill allows only the regulated entities to partici-
pate in the auctioning and trading of carbon allowances, unlike
the other proposals, which would create a secondary market for
150 E.g., Steve Hargreaves, Fight Global Warming, Get $1,100 a Year, CNN MONEY
(Dec. 30, 2009), http://money.cnn.com/2009/12/23/news/economy/
cap-and dividend/; Jim Snyder, Cantwell-Collins Bill Attracts Support from Some,
Loses Others, THE HILL (Dec. 14, 2009), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/
71995-cantwell-collins-climate-bill-attracts-new-support-but-may-lose-
some?page=2.
'5' Memorandum from the Office of Sen. Maria Cantwell on the CLEAR Act: A
Cap & Refund Approach to Energy Independence and Climate Change Mitiga-
tion 1 (Dec. 10, 2009) [hereinafter Cantwell Memo], available at http://
cantwell.senate.gov/issues/CLEAR%20Act%200verview%2OMemo.pdf.
152 CLEAR Act Side-by-Side with Waxman-Markey, H.R. 2454, OFFICE OF SEN. MA-
IUA CANTWELL, http://cantwell.senate.gov/issues/CLEAR%20Act%2Side-by-
Side%20with%20ACES.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2010) (comparing the major pro-
visions of the Waxman-Markey Bill with the Cantwell-Collins Bill).
153 Cantwell Memo, supra note 151; see also Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S.
Cap-And-Trade System to Address Climate Change, 32 HARv. ENvrTL. L. REv. 293, 293
(2008) (proposing "an upstream, economy-wide C02 cap-and-trade system" as
the best method for a cost-effective climate change solution).
15 Press Release, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, supra note 128, at 3.
155 OFFICE OF SEN. MARIA CANTWELL, supra note 152, at 2.
156 Id. at 2-3.
157 Id.
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trading allowances.1 58  This avoids market manipulation and
speculation and allows for more transparency in the auctioning
system.'59
One of the central features of the Cantwell-Collins Bill is that
seventy-five percent of the revenue from the sale of allowances
at auction would be returned directly to citizens in the form of
non-taxable dividends, equaling about $1000 per individual.1 6 0
These dividends could then be used to offset any increases in
energy prices. 16 The other twenty-five percent of the revenue
from allowances would go into a trust to fund climate and clean
energy-related programs. 16 However, the Cantwell-Collins Bill
and the other Senate bills are far from completion, and which
one will pass and in what form, if any, still remains uncertain. 6 3
IV. EMISSIONS REGULATION AND THE
AVIATION INDUSTRY
A. PREDICTING THE FoRM OF U.S. CLIMATE LEGISLATION
Considering the collapse of the Senate's efforts at compre-
hensive climate change legislation, it is impossible to predict
what form such legislation will ultimately take. But, despite the
lack of consensus regarding the ultimate shape of a cap and
trade program,164 it is likely that Congress will enact some form
of federal legislation regulating carbon and other GHG emis-
sions in the very near future.' The White House has main-
tained pressure on Congress to enact climate legislation.1 6 6
Additionally, numerous businesses, industries, and environmen-
1s Id.
159 Snyder, supra note 150.
16o OFFICE OF SEN. MARIA CANTWELL, supra note 152, at 2. The Waxman-Mar-
key Bill does call for rebates to lower income families to be distributed through
local utilities. Snyder, supra note 150.
161 Cantwell Memo, supra note 151, at 6.
162 Id. at 6-7.
163 See sources cited supra note 146.
16 See Bryan, supra note 145.
165 E.g., Harrison, Jr. et al., supra note 111, at 165 ("The United States seems
likely to develop a national cap-and-trade program for GHG emissions within the
next several years, a program that might be accompanied by regional or state
programs.").
166 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the Union
Address (Jan. 27, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address) (remarking that creating
clean energy jobs "means passing a comprehensive energy and climate bill with
incentives that will finally make clean energy the profitable kind of energy in
America").
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tal groups, 16 such as the U.S. Climate Action Partnership (US-
CAP), a coalition of industry leaders and environmental groups,
are calling for "prompt enactment of national legislation in the
United States to slow, stop and reverse the growth of [GHG]
emissions over the shortest time reasonably achievable."' Of
course, groups such as USCAP are composed of many industries
that would be directly affected by any carbon regulation.' 9
Thus, they have a keen interest in shaping national legislation to
soften the impact on their respective interests.
Nevertheless, as these groups and others recognize, a feder-
ally mandated and regulated program is necessary to give clear
guidance to businesses, to provide administrative consistency,
and to prevent constitutional problems that may hinder re-
gional programs. 70 Despite the pressing need for federal legis-
lation, however, the economic downturn and high rate of
unemployment threaten to undermine the success of climate
change reform."' In fact, some even fear carbon regulation will
only make problems worse and delay recovery.1 7 2 Therefore,
167 Eg., Letter from We Can Lead, Business Leaders in Support of Strong En-
ergy and Climate Policy, to President Obama and Members of Congress (Jan. 21,
2010), available at http://wecanlead.org/jan2010.pdf (coalition of 150 compa-
nies calling for "strong policies and clear market signals that support the transi-
tion to a low-carbon economy and reward companies that innovate" because
"today's uncertainty surrounding energy and climate regulation is hindering the
large-scale actions that American businesses are poised to make"); Business for
Innovative Climate and Energy Policy (BICEP), CERES, http://www.ceres.org/bicep
(last visited Sept. 9, 2010) (coalition of over 80 businesses whose "goal is to work
directly with key allies in the business community and with members of Congress
to pass meaningful energy and climate change legislation"); BUSINESS LEADERS
FOR CLIMATE SOLUTIONS, http://www.climatesolutions.org/solutions/initiatives/
blcs (last visited May 26, 2010) (coalition of nearly 600 businesses in the North-
west U.S. supporting strong climate and energy policies).
-e See U.S. CLIMATE AcrION P'sH-IIP, supra note 121, at 1.
169 See supra note 54.
170 See, e.g., MacDougald, supra note 121 (arguing that climate law must be fed-
erally based because of potential limitations to regional measures imposed by the
dormant commerce clause); Robert B. McKinstry, Jr. et al., The New Climate World:
Achieving Economic Efficiency in a Federal System for Greenhouse Gas Control Through
State Planning Combined with Federal Programs, 34 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REC. 767
(2009); Yang, supra note 116; Letter from We Can Lead, supra note 167
("[Tjoday's uncertainty surrounding energy and climate regulation is hindering
the large-scale actions that American businesses are poised to make.").
17, E.g., Editorial, The Case for Climate Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2010, at WK9.
172 E.g., Editorial, California Cap-and-Trade Revolt, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2010, at
A18 (discussing a ballot initiative in California seeking to delay implementation
of the state's cap and trade program scheduled to go into effect in 2012 because
of the economic problems faced by the state); Tom Switzer, Editorial, The Climate
is Changing, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014
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even though Congress faces a steep uphill climb in passing cli-
mate change legislation, there is a strong possibility of some
form of federal climate change regulation in the near future.
While determining the details of any climate change legisla-
tion would be futile, it is worthwhile to narrow down the choices
for an emissions-reduction program based on the form the regu-
lations take: cap and trade, carbon tax, or direct EPA regulation.
Of these three forms, a carbon tax is unlikely to succeed due to
the lack of political will to support a tax of any sort, even though
a tax may be the most effective means for reducing emissions. 173
Direct EPA regulation of GHG emissions remains a possible al-
ternative, especially if Congress fails to take action." However,
command-and-control regulation on this scale and scope faces
strong resistance from industries and from within Congress."'
Therefore, any legislation that passes will likely be either in the
form of a hybrid cap and trade program similar to the Waxman-
Markey Bill or the Cantwell-Collins Bill, whose simplicity may be
a winning virtue. 176 Nevertheless, it is useful to take a brief look
at both the potential impact of the specific forms of legislation
or regulation on the aviation industry and the industry's re-
sponses to these proposals.
B. POTENTIAL REGULATORY IMPACT: INDUSTRY RESPONSE
1. Cap and Trade Legislation
The form that any cap and trade legislation ultimately takes-
whether upstream or downstream-is, for the most part, irrele-
vant because the bottom line for the aviation industry will be the
same: the cost of fossil fuels will very likely rise.1 77 This will effec-
24052748703652104574651610217495546.html (discussing political develop-
ments in Australia and their relation to a worldwide reconsideration of the costs
of cap and trade).
173 See discussion supra Part II.D.
174 See Broder, supra note 35 (noting that House Majority leader Harry Reid
prefers legislation to EPA regulation, but wants the agency to "retain the author-
ity to act if Congress does not"); discussion supra Part II.C.
175 See Broder, supra note 35 (discussing recent legislation seeking to strip the
EPA of its power to regulate GHGs under the CAA); discussion supra Part II.C.
176 See discussion supra Part III.C.
177 As discussed above, this is one of the primary ways cap and trade programs
reduce CO 2 emissions. See, e.g., John M. Doyle, Pricey Control, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., June 1, 2009, at 20 (citing Jim May, president and CEO of the Air
Transport Association (ATA), as estimating Waxman-Markey Bill would increase
the cost of aviation jet fuel by $1.40-1.70 per gallon); Daniel Whitten, House Cli-
mate Bill Lifts Gas Price 77 Cents, API Says, BLOOMBERG (June 8, 2009), http://www.
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tively work as an additional tax on aviation fuel and on airlines
in general." Consequently, the aviation industry has come out
strongly against economy-wide cap and trade proposals."1 7  The
industry's resistance to cap and trade, however, comes not sim-
ply from an opposition to being taxed, 8 o but from the impact
this extra cost will have on the industry."' More specifically, the
ATA, whose membership includes the principal U.S. passenger
and cargo airlines as well as airline manufacturers, 1 2 argues that
the aviation industry is already "motivated by market forces to
improve fuel and GHG efficiency" since fuel already represents
"between 30 to 50 percent of total airline operating
expenses. 183
Airlines, in fact, have been motivated for years to reduce fuel-
related costs by improving fuel efficiency and, in turn, reducing
carbon and other GHG emissions." Consequently, airlines ar-
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601 130&sid=a_559D1XN710&refer=environ-
ment (noting that the American Petroleum Institute (API) calculates the cost of
jet fuel would rise by 83 cents under the Waxman-Markey Bill).
178 Unnikrishnan & Wall, supra note 133.
179 E.g., James C. May, President of ATA, Opinion, Aviation Woes, WASH. TIMES
(June 5, 2008), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jun/05/aviation-
woes/; Steve Sear, Delta Air Lines Vice President of Global Sales, (Op-Ed.,) Cap-
and-Trade Policy Could Hamper the Reduction of Airline Carbon Emissions, Bus. TRAVEL
NEWS (Aug. 17, 2009), http://www.btnonline.com/businesstravelnews/head-
lines/frontpage-displayjsp?vnu content id=1004003444; Unnikrishnan & Wall,
supra note 133 (noting aviation's general opposition to a cap and trade pro-
gram); Cargo Airline Association, Climate Change Legislation: An Aviation Perspec-
tive, available at http://globalwarming.house.gov/files/LTTR/ACES/CargoAir
lineAssoc.pdf (last visitedJune 21, 2010) (voicing the Cargo Airline Association's
opposition to a cap and trade program).
s The aviation industry is already quite heavily taxed. See Government Imposed
Taxes/Fees on Commercial Air Travel, AIR TRANSP. Ass'N, http://www.airlines.org/
economics/taxes/pages/GovTaxesandFeesonAirlineTravel.aspx (last visited
Sept. 9, 2010) (providing a list of all aviation related excise taxes and fees, includ-
ing a 4.3 cent jet fuel tax, with comparison to past taxes and fees).
181 See Climate Change Impacts on the Transportation Sector: The Airline's Climate
Change Commitment: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp.,
110th Cong. 3-5 (2008) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of John M. Meenan,
Exec. Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, Air Transp. Ass'n of Am.,
Inc.); Fact Sheet: Why One-Size-Fits-All Cap-and-Trade Legislation Does Not Fit Aviation,
AIR TRANsp. Ass'N, http://www.airlines.org/environmental+affairs/fact+sheets+
and+links/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2010) (follow "Why One-Size-Fits-All Cap-and-
Trade Legislation Does Not Fit Aviation" hyperlink).
182 Membership, AIR TRANsP. Ass'N, http://www.airlines.org/About/Member-
ship/Pages/membership.aspx (last visited Sept. 9, 2010).
183 AIR TRANsp. Ass'N, supra note 181.
184 Hearing, supra note 181, at 3-6; Fact Sheet: Commercial Aviation's Environmen-
tal Efforts, AIR TRANsp. Ass'N, http://www.airlines.org/environmental+affairs/
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gue that if Congress implements a cap and trade program, the
resulting costs from the increased tax burden would "under-
mine the ultimate aim of [cap and trade]-to decrease carbon
emissions-by making it difficult, if not impossible, for U.S. air-
lines to invest in the technology and alternative fuels that can
reduce harmful [GHGs]."' Therefore, if Congress does suc-
ceed in passing cap and trade, airlines should ask Congress to
reinvest some of the money generated by the program back into
the aviation industry where it can be used to fund "development
and deployment of more fuel-efficient aircraft and low carbon
jet fuels," along with other related measures.1 8 6
While all cap and trade programs are similar in that industries
share in fuel price increases, differences in how each program
treats allowance allocation and trading can affect the program's
impact on the airlines. Under cap and trade programs that di-
rectly cap airline emissions, such as the EU ETS, airlines could
receive allowances and trade them on the market.'8 7 This would
not be the case under programs that hold the fuel producers
responsible for emissions, such as the Waxman-Markey and
Kerry-Boxer Bills, because the airlines are not themselves
capped, and the impact is only secondary in the form of fuel
price increases.1 8 8 Because airlines have already demonstrated
their ability and the continued necessity to reduce fuel con-
sumption and emissions,'"' airlines could potentially collect and
trade excess allowances on the open market to help them meet
the increased fuel costs and pursue more fuel efficient technolo-
gies with those funds.o90 However, this only works when the pro-
gram allocates tradable allowances to airlines, which is not a
feature in any of the current Congressional proposals.19 ' Fur-
thermore, under the upstream-focused Cantwell-Collins Bill, air-
fact§heets+and+links/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2010) (follow "Commercial Aviation's
Environmental Efforts" hyperlink).
185 Sear, supra note 179; AIR TRANSP. Ass'N, supra note 181.
186 AIR TRANsp. Ass'N, THE AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION CLIMATE CHANGE COM-
MITMENT: A GLOBAL, SECTORAL APPROACH 1 (2009), available at http://
www.airlines.org/government/issuebriefs/Climate-Change-Commitment-Global-
Sectoral-Approach.htm (follow "Click here for PDF" hyperlink); see also Un-
nikrishnan & Wall, supra note 133.
187 See ELLERMAN & JOSKOw, supra note 59, at 1-2.
188 See Unnikrishnan & Wall, supra note 133.
189 Hearing, supra note 181, at 3-7.
190 Aircraft Engine Emissions, INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., http://www.icao.int/
icao/en/env/aee.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2010); see also Conrad, supra note 33,
at 947.
191 Aircraft Engine Emissions, supra note 190.
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lines would most certainly be cut out of the allowance and
trading program since the Bill restricts allowance trading only to
first-emitters. 19 2 The aviation industry should consider these is-
sues as it assesses the different cap and trade proposals.
Airlines that fly internationally have also voiced concerns that
an American cap and trade system would combine with the EU
ETS to impose a double taxation on airlines.1 9 3 As discussed
above, the Waxman-Markey Bill does acknowledge this potential
problem, but it does nothing to actually resolve the problem. 19 4
Such questions would need to be addressed definitively and in
further detail by any cap and trade program.
2. Carbon Tax
A direct carbon tax imposed on fossil fuels and aviation fuel
in particular would impact the airline industry much like a cap
and trade program by increasing fuel costs.1 9 5 Likewise, this
would have a negative effect on the industry by redirecting re-
sources from the pursuit of low-carbon options to the increased
cost associated with the tax.19 ' Therefore, a carbon tax is not
likely to receive much support from the aviation industry. Even
so, at least one airline association, the Cargo Airline Association
(Association), supports a revenue-neutral carbon tax as an alter-
native to a cap and trade program.'
Under the Association's carbon tax proposal, the direct tax on
the use of aviation fuel would be offset by a decrease in existing
excise taxes.' This would make the tax revenue-neutral in that
it would "retain the same overall level of industry taxation" while
simultaneously providing incentive for modernization and in-
creases in fuel efficiency to reduce the burden of the increased
fuel tax.' Moreover, the Association proposes that since the
amount of revenue collected could be easily attributed to the
airlines, all or at least a portion of these funds could go toward
192 See supra Part III.C.3.
193 See Unnikrishnan & Wall, supra note 133.
194 See supra Part III.C.1.
195 See HANSEN, supra note 37, at 209-10.
196 This would work much the same as cap and trade by undermining the in-
dustry's goals and ability to increase efficiency. See Sear, supra note 179.
197 Statement of Cargo Airline Association: Hearing on Trade Aspects of Climate
Change Legislation Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 111th Cong. (2009)
[hereinafter Statement] (statement of Steve Alterman, President of the Cargo Air-
line Ass'n).
19s Id. at 2.
199 Id.
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"convert[ing] the nation's air traffic system into one based upon
satellite technology rather than the existing reliance on decades-
old ground-based radar." 00 Tax revenue could also fund re-
search into more fuel-efficient aircraft and engines.o1
A revenue-neutral tax for airlines that would not raise aviation
taxes but simply redistribute them, as the Association proposes,
might prove a more viable alternative than a cap and trade pro-
gram.20 2 A tax becomes a more viable alternative when coupled
with a plan to put the tax revenue back into funding aviation
technology, since, under a cap and trade program with a similar
funding measure, it would be difficult to track precisely how
much of the airlines' cost increase is due to the program. How-
ever, as discussed above, the current political unfeasibility of a
carbon tax makes this solution unlikely.203
3. Command-and-Control Regulation
If the EPA decides to regulate aircraft engines under section
231 of the CAA as sources of carbon emissions, such regulation
would, of course, have a direct impact on aviation.o However,
because of the international nature of the aviation industry, di-
rect EPA regulation would encounter several problems. 2 05 First,
global regulation of airline emissions has generally fallen under
the province of the ICAO. Even the Kyoto Protocol, which ex-
cludes aviation emissions, directs that parties to the treaty
should work through the ICAO to reduce aviation-related
GHGs.on Further, the United States has traditionally con-
formed its regulations issued under section 231 to those recom-
mended by the ICAO, even lowering them in the 1980s to meet
ICAO regulations.2 07 In this respect, EPA regulations could face
difficulties since ICAO's regulation guidelines do not currently
address GHG emissions.2 0  Nevertheless, non-international
200 Id. at 2-3.
201 Id.; see AIR TRANsP. Ass'N, supra note 186.
202 See Statement, supra note 197, at 3-4.
203 See supra Part II.D.
204 See 42 U.S.C. § 7571 (a) (2) (A) (2009) (providing the EPA Administrator
with the power to "issue proposed emission standards applicable to the emission
of any air pollutant from any class or classes of aircraft engines which in his judg-
ment causes, or contributes to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated
to endanger public health or welfare").
205 Conrad, supra note 33, at 943-47.
206 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 14, art. 2, 1 2; Conrad, supra note 33, at 943-44.
207 Conrad, supra note 33, at 944.
20s Id.; Aircraft Engine Emissions, supra note 190.
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steps to regulate GHGs, such as those mandated by the EU ETS
to regulate aviation emissions,o' could force the ICAO to act in
creating international standards for GHG emissions. 2 0 Like-
wise, well-crafted, realistic EPA regulations could force the
ICAO to adopt those standards as the new international targets
for GHG emissions reduction. 1
The aviation industry recognizes that predictable, uniform in-
ternational standards are a crucial and necessary step to the ef-
fective and efficient regulation of aviation emissions on a
national and international scale. 1 In fact, the ATA and the In-
ternational Air Transport Association (IATA) have joined to-
gether "in adopting an ambitious set of targets to mitigate GHG
emissions from [the aviation] industry under a global, sectoral
approach. 2 1 3 Such targets include continuing fuel-efficiency
improvements, creating a goal for carbon-neutral growth, and
reducing CO2 emissions fifty percent by 2050.214 Appropriate
EPA regulations in conjunction with ICAO standards could bol-
ster the industry's existing commitment to increasing energy ef-
ficiency as driven by its desire to reduce fuel related-costs.1 5
C. THE GLOBAL, SECTORAL APPROACH
Because of aviation's unique global reach and its successful
and continued efforts at increasing efficiency and reducing
emissions, the industry does not fit well into a generalized, econ-
omy-wide emissions reduction program. In fact, whether such
reduction programs come in the form of cap and trade or a car-
bon tax, their fundamental goal-to reduce carbon and other
GHG emissions simply by making fossil fuels too expensive-is
contradicted when applied without modification to the airline
industry. These programs would drive up airlines' costs and se-
verely inhibit an already anguished industry's attempts to reduce
emissions by increasing efficiency. As an alternative, aviation
groups such as the ATA and IATA have adopted a global,
20o See supra Part III.A.
210 Conrad, supra note 33, at 944-45.
211 See id.
212 See AIR TRANsP. Ass'N, supra note 186; Giovanni Bisignani, Editorial, Avia-
tion and Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/09/20/opinion/20iht-edbisi.1.7583290.html.
213 AIR TRANsp. Ass'N, supra note 186, at 1.
214 Id.
215 See Hearing, supra note 181, at 2-3, 11-12 (calling for "Congress to work to
complement airline GHG initiatives").
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sectoral approach to reducing GHG emissions and have asked
Congress to join them."'
The ATA's global, sectoral approach calls for further efforts
by airlines to "invest in new aircraft, fleet upgrades, operational
improvements, sustainable alternative fuels and other innova-
tions to achieve the bulk of the fuel- and GHG- efficiency im-
provements needed . . . ." The plan requests assistance in
achieving these goals from associated industries and govern-
ments.2 18 In addition to seeking help with modernizing the air
traffic control system and researching alternative fuels, the ap-
proach requires a comprehensive national energy policy that ac-
knowledges the need for the global regulation of aviation
emissions under the UNFCCC and the ICAO. 2 19
More importantly, the success of the global, sectoral approach
depends on "[e]nsuring that domestic climate change policy is
not counterproductive to continued improvements within the
industry."2 2 o As discussed above, climate legislation that blindly
taxes airlines is not effective at reducing emissions.2 2 1 Rather,
legislation and policies should create markets where fuel prices
are stable and where revenue collected from emissions regula-
tion is reinvested in new technologies to help solve the climate
change problem.2 Finally, without a global approach to emis-
sions regulation, airlines could "be subject to a patchwork of va-
rying, unilateral programs throughout the world."2 2 3
An approach that recognizes the specific requirements and
difficulties faced by a particular sector, such as the one the ATA
has proposed, goes much further toward ensuring that climate
change policies and legislation achieve their intended goals of
emissions reduction. 2 2 4 Accordingly, those connected to the avi-
ation industry and concerned for it should speak up and make
certain that the interests of the U.S. commercial airline industry
are heard and recognized.
216 See id. at 1-13; AIR TRANsp. Ass'N, supra note 186, at 1-5.
217 AIR TRANsp. Ass'N, supra note 186, at 2.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 2-4. A recent study by the University of Oxford found that improving
air traffic management could reduce emissions by 5% to 8%. Flight Management
Aids Aviation Emission Cuts, BBC NEws (Feb. 1, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/business/8487590.stm.
220 AIR TRANsp. Ass'N, supra note 186, at 3.
221 See discussion supra Part IV.B. 1.
222 See AIR TRANsp. Ass'N, supra note 186, at 3-5.
223 Id.




Climate change policymakers and the aviation industry share
the very same goals-to reduce emissions of GHGs, especially
CO. What differ are the reasons and the means for achieving
this goal: policymakers want to stop global warming by reducing
emissions, and the aviation industry wants to reduce costs
through increased fuel efficiency (which has the incidental ef-
fect of reducing emissions). By not considering and adequately
addressing the unique set of challenges facing the aviation in-
dustry, current climate change legislation, especially cap and
trade, faces the risk of hampering both its own and aviation's
ability to reach their shared goal of reducing emissions.
Therefore, with the government's help in recognizing a need
for a unified, sectoral approach founded on strong fiscal and
legal policies that encourage specific goals rather than punish
polluters arbitrarily, both the aviation industry and the U.S. gov-
ernment may soon find themselves closer to reaching their
shared goal of emissions reduction.
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